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The Copyright Notice Requirement-
Deliberate Omission of Notice
By WARREN L. PATRON*
JOHN C. HOGAN**
I
Introduction
Under the copyright law which was in effect until January 1,
1978, it was necessary to place a copyright notice on a pub-
lished work in order to obtain copyright protection. If the no-
tice was omitted from any substantial number of copies1 the
copyright was lost forever and could not be retrieved whether
the omission was deliberate or inadvertent. Under the new
law, the Copyright Act of 1976,2 inadvertent omission of the
copyright notice does not invalidate the copyright on a pub-
lished work, subject to certain limitations. But the effect on
the copyright if the notice is deliberately omitted is uncertain.
The uncertainty stems from the unclear wording of section
405(a)(2), which provides that an omission of notice can be
cured if a reasonable effort is made to add notice to all copies
that are distributed "after the omission has been discovered.
'3
The problem involves the meaning of the word "discovery."
The issue is whether one can "discover" one's deliberate omis-
* B.S., California Institute of Technology, 1934; J.D., Loyola University, L.A.,
U.S.C., Minneapolis-Minnesota College of Law, 1947. Of Counsel, Fulwider, Patton,
Rieber, Lee & Utecht, Los Angeles, California.
** A.B., M.A., Ph.D., University of California Los Angeles, 1942, 1948, 1974. Adjunct
Professor, Claremont Graduate School; Administrator, Rand Corporation.
1. The definition of "copies" is set forth in 17 U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976): "'Copies'
are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The
term 'copies' includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work
is first fixed."
2. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
3. An additional question can arise as to the date of the copyright if the copyright
notice is deliberately omitted when the work is first published, and thereafter the work
is distributed with a proper notice.
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sion or whether the deliberate nature of the omission pre-
cludes the ability of one to discover it.
This article will discuss the effect of the deliberate omission
of a notice of copyright in two situations: first, where the intent
is to relinquish or abandon the claim to copyright and to place
the work in the public domain, and second where the author,
through ignorance or mistake, does not assert his rights. The
article begins with a brief discussion of the history of the no-
tice requirement in copyright law. After discussing the possi-
ble effects of deliberate omission of notice under the current
law, the article examines the apparent conflict between the
wording of the statute and the legislative history of the Act,
which indicates that the statute-makers wanted to minimize
the significance of the notice requirement.
II
Significance of the Notice Requirement
Under common law, an author's rights in his work were lost
when the work was published.' Later, as the idea of copyright
developed, an author's rights in his published works were rec-
ognized if he gave notice to the world and followed certain
specified procedures. Generally required was the filing, in
some central repository, of a claim to copyright and inclusion
of a notice of the author or successor's claim to copyright on
the work. In the United States a copyright claim must be filed
in the Copyright Office, a subdivision of the Library of Con-
gress, and the copyright notice should be "Copyright 19XX,
Author," or "© 19XX Author." In the case of certain works of
art, greeting cards for example, the year of publication may be
omitted6 but the basic idea has been to give the public notice
that the work is copyrighted.7
Over the years the broad idea of copyright has changed and
gradually, many countries have developed the idea that an au-
thor's work is automatically protected for a certain limited
time after its creation.' The United States is one of the very
few countries still requiring that a creator give notice of his
4. See infra section IV, B of text, beginning after note 38.
5. See L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 16-17 (1968).
6. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 401(b) (2) (1976).
7. See generally 2 NiMmER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.08[A] [1]-[2] (1982).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 135 (1976).
[Vol. 5
DELIBERATE OMISSION OF NOTICE
claim to copyright by the provision of a notice on the work.9
Nevertheless, it has long been recognized that in many cases
a copyright notice has been omitted from a work which the au-
thor wishes to protect by copyright. Often the notice is unin-
tentionally or inadvertently omitted and those drafting the
new copyright law sought to protect the creators of such
works.10 However, determining what was in a creator's mind at
the time of publication presents a difficult problem of proof.
Unless the creator declares a deliberate intention to omit the
notice it will not be clear whether an omission of the notice
was deliberate or inadvertent. If the law provided for a cure of
an inadvertant omission but not of a deliberate one it would
seem that a creator who deliberately omitted notice but did not
express his intention could later plead inadvertance to enable
himself to cure the omission. The problem of determining the
author's subjective intent was discussed in the course of ear-
lier attempts to amend the Copyright Act.
In 1965, Abraham L. Kaminstein (who was then United
States Register of Copyrights) commenting on the Report of
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S.
Copyright Law (July 19, 1961) said:
In the discussions of the Report's proposals (and of the 1963
preliminary draft which to some extent adopted them) it was
urged that, to make the validity of a copyright turn on the ques-
tion of whether the omission of notice was 'deliberate' or 'unin-
tentional' would involve impossible problems of proof and
would result in uncertainty and injustice. After considering
these arguments we concluded that questions involving the
subjective state of mind of one or more persons and their igno-
rance or knowledge of the law should be avoided, if at all possi-
ble. Assuming that it also contains proper safeguards to
protect the public and thus keep the notice requirements from
becoming meaningless, we decided that the Bill should drop
any distinction between 'deliberate' and 'inadvertent' or 'unin-
9. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.02 (1982).
10. See legislative history of General Revision of Copyright Law, S. 22, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); CONF. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 122 CONG.
REC. (1976), compiled in 1976 U.S. CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659-5823. Excerpts from
the history also appear in 17 U.S.CA. § 405 (West 1981). An early draft copyright law
revision bill was S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). See also 2 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING
TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 (Latman & Lighstone eds. 1981) [The Act is printed in
full in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2541-2602.1
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tentional' omission [of the notice] and, subject to certain con-
ditions, should preserve the copyright in all cases.'
The new Copyright Act, however, does not eliminate the dis-
tinction which Kaminstein sought to avoid.
The copyright notice requirement is set forth in section 401,
and the effect of omission of the notice is set forth in section
405.12 Section 405 provides that omission of the copyright no-
11. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION. Part 6. Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill.
House Committee Print, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1965).
12. Section 401. Notice of copyright: Visually perceptible copies
(a) General requirement. Whenever a work protected under this title is
published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright own-
er, a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all pub-
licly distributed copies from which the work can be visually perceived, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
(b) Form of notice. The notice appearing on the copies shall consist of the
following three elements:
(1) the symbol © (the letter C in a circle), or the word "Copyright," or
the abbreviation "Copr."; and
(2) the year of first publication of work; in the case of compilations or
derivative works incorporating previously published material, the year
date of the first publication of the compilation or derivative work is suffi-
cient. The year date may be omitted where a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work, with accompanying text matter, if any, is reproduced in or on
greeting cards, postcards, stationery, jewelry, dolls, toys, or any useful ar-
ticles; and
(3) the name of the owner of copyright in the work, or an abbreviation by
which the name can be recognized, or a generally known alternative
designation of the owner.
(c) Position of the Notice. The notice shall be affixed to the copies in such
manner and location as to give reasonable notice of the claim of copyright.
The Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation, as examples, specific
methods of affixation and positions of the notice on various types of works that
will satisfy this requirement, but these specifications shall not be considered
exhaustive.
Section 405. Notice of copyright: Omission of notice
(a) Effect of Omission on Copyright. The omission of the copyright no-
tice prescribed by sections 401 through 403 from copies or phonorecords pub-
licly distributed by authority of the copyright owner does not invalidate the
copyright in a work if-
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small
number of copies or phonorecords distributed to the public; or
(2) registration for the work has been made before or is made within five
years after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is made
to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are distributed to the pub-
lic in the United States after the omission has been discovered; or
(3) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express requirement in
writing that, as a condition of the copyright owner's authorization of the
public distribution of copies or phonorecords, they bear the prescribed
notice.
(b) Effect of Omission on Innocent Infringers. Any person who innocently
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tice does not invalidate the copyright in a work if "registration
for the work has been made before or is made within five years
after the publication without notice, and a reasonable effort is
made to add notice to all copies or phonorecords that are dis-
tributed to the public in the United States after the omission
has been discovered . . -. Because of an unfortunate choice
of words, the distinction between deliberate and unintentional
omission is preserved, perhaps inadvertently, by the 1976 Act.
Subsection (a) (2) of section 405 of the Act speaks of the omis-
sion of the notice as being "discovered," which implies an acci-
dental or unknown omission. 14  This conflicts with the
legislative history of the statute, wherein it was asserted that,
infringes a copyright, in reliance upon an authorized copy or phonorecord
from which the copyright notice has been omitted, incurs no liability for actual
or statutory damages under section 504 for any infringing acts committed
before receiving actual notice that registration for the work has been made
under section 408, if such person proves that he or she was misled by the omis-
sion of notice. In a suit for infringement in such a case the court may allow or
disallow recovery of any of the infringer's profits attributable to the infringe-
ment, and may enjoin the continuation of the infringing undertaking, or may
require, as a condition of permitting the continuation of the infringing under-
taking, that the infringer pay the copyright owner a reasonable license fee in
an amount and on terms fixed by the court.
(c) Removal of Notice. Protection under this title is not affected by the
removal, destruction, or obliteration of the notice, without the authorization of
the copyright owner, from any publicly distributed copies or phonorecords.
13. 17 U.S.C. app. § 405(a) (2) (1976) (emphasis added).
14. It is a non sequitur to argue that a deliberate omission of the notice is a mis-
take that can be "discovered" later. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 432 (Compact
Edition, 1979) offers two primary meanings for the word "discover":
1. Uncovered; bare; having the head bare.
2. Made manifest; found out, revealed, divulged.
Also given are several definitions, one especially pertinent to this discussion, viz:
To obtain sight or knowledge of (something previously unknown) for the first time.
Examples given of these usages are:
1727. "He sent out his long-boat to discover what I was." (SwiFT, GULLIVER, II,
viii, 169).
1783. "We invent things that are new; we discover what was before hidden.
Galileo invented the telescope; Harvey discovered the circulation of the
blood." (H. Blair, Lect. Rhet. X).
1892. "The defendant Burton says he discovered that he had made a mistake,"
(Si H.E. LOPES in Law Times' Rep. LXVII.).
Thus, while "mistakes" (e.g., unintentional omission of notice from a work) are things
which can be "discovered," they must be (1) not previously known and (2) brought to
sight (knowledge) for the first time. An omission that is intentional satisfies neither of
these conditions.
[Editor's Note: Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1305
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), was decided while this article was being printed. The Southern Dis-
trict Court of New York said in Beacon that, "the statute's use of the phrase 'after the
omission has been discovered' clearly suggests that it is unintentional omission that
COMM/ENT L. J.
"[u] nder the proposed law a work published without any copy-
right notice will still be subject to copyright protection for at
least five years, whether the omission was partial or total, unin-
tentional or deliberate."'"
III
Publication With Intent Not to Claim Copyright
Protection
When an author creates a work "fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression," his work is protected under the present
copyright law.16 The author or his successor in interest, such
as an employer or an assignee of the author's rights, may then
disseminate the work and register the copyright on that work.
Generally, copyright protection is desired, but in certain cases,
it is not. Instead, the author may wish to forego copyright pro-
tection and place the work in the public domain so that it is
available to everyone. For example, certain research and
scholarly organizations do not wish copyright protection and
want the work to be widely disseminated and made available
without limitation to anyone.
The copyright status of a work published under such a proce-
dure is unclear under the present statute. Prior to January 1,
1978, the right to secure copyright was lost if the work was pub-
lished without the proper notice. Publishing without notice ac-
ted as aforfeiture of the right and cases based on the 1909 Act
regarded this as terminating or ending the right. 17 The 1976 Act
§ 405 (a) (2) permits to be cured. Simply put, one cannot 'discover' an omission that
has been deliberate." Id. at 1310.]
15. COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1976).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Definition of when a work is "fixed."
17. The sources consulted in our research speak of the right to copyright being
terminated by,
Expiration (at end of the original term and its renewal period, if any),
Forfeiture (ispo facto, by law),
Abandonment (voluntary relinquishment of the right),
Dedication (purposeful disposition of the right),
Laches (careless handling of the copyright, its notice, etc.),
Annulment (involuntary relinquishment of the right),
Divestment (foreign Government "divestments" of U.S. copyrights).
See R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAw 121 (1912). "There is no author-
ity on the point, and it is difficult to say what amount of evidence the court would
require as to the fact of a dedication of a copyright to the public." COPINGER & SKONE
JAMES ON COPYRIGHT, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT § 287 (F. JAMES & E. JAMES
10th ed. 1965). Cf. Rowell, C.J.O, in the "Who's Who in Canada" case; International
Press Ltd. v. Tunnell, [1938] 1 D.L.R. 393, 410-411.
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does not expressly provide for dedication or abandonment of a
copyright. Apparently then, the publication of a work in which
the notice is deliberately omitted neither forfeits nor abandons
the copyright, but instead leaves the work in some indefinite
status. It seems clear that if more than five years elapse after
the first publication and the requirements for copyright have
not been met (i.e., registration of the claim to copyright and
application of the notice), then there is no copyright. But
before five years have gone by, and absent an express aban-
donment, section 405 of the statute leaves uncertain the status
of the work which has been published and on which the notice
has been deliberately omitted.18
There are relatively few choices in deciding the status of
such a work during the first five years after publication: first,
the deliberate omission could be considered an express act of
abandonment; second, the intent of the author could be disre-
garded; and third, the work could be given a "conditional"
copyright.
If the first choice is adopted, deliberate publication of a work
without a notice would be considered to constitute an express
act of abandonment. But unless there is express proof of in-
tent to omit the notice and forfeit the copyright, the problem
18. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (2). [Editor's Note: Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg &
Co., 552 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), was decided while this article was being printed.
In Beacon, the plaintiff asserted that § 405(a) (2) permits only unintentional omissions
of notice to be cured. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that regardless of
whether the omission was deliberate or unintentional, forfeiture of the copyright can
be avoided if the copyright is registered within five years of publication without notice
and "reasonable efforts" are taken to affix notice. Id. at 1310. Essentially, the defend-
ant was arguing that § 405(a) (2) creates a "conditional copyright," as the authors sug-
gest in this article. The court did not agree, holding that § 405(a) (2) relates solely to
unintentional omissions. Id. at 1310. See editor's note, supra note 14. In effect, the
court adopted the first choice suggested by the authors of this article-deliberate pub-
lication of a work without a notice would be considered to constitute an express act of
abandonment. Id. at 1312.
The court in Beacon further suggests that where deliberate omission of notice is at
issue, the number of copies distributed without notice is a key factor in determining
whether the copyright has been forfeited. If the number of copies distributed is "rela-
tively small," § 405(a) (1) is said to apply, precluding forfeiture. If numerous copies are
published without notice, § 405(a) (2) is said to apply, resulting in forfeiture of the
copyright. Indeed, § 405(a) (2) reasonably construed in light of § 405(a) (1) suggests
this numerical distinction. However, now that two circuit court opinions are in conflict,
the issue of deliberate omission of notice should be resolved by analysis of the legisla-
tive history. As the authors of this article demonstrate, reference to that legislative
history indicates that the statute-makers wanted to minimize the significance of the
notice requirement.]
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that concerned Kaminstein would remain, 9 namely, how do
we determine the intent of the author? Moreover, this status
was found unsatisfactory under the 1909 Act and it is directly
contrary to the intent of the framers of the Act that the distinc-
tion between the deliberate and intentional omissions should
not be significant. This should not be the status of such a work.
The second possible status, to hold that the work is copy-
righted for the full statutory period, would disregard the intent
of the author unless the intent was expressly stated. This sta-
tus is unacceptable because it is contrary to both the intent of
the framers of the Act and to the express wording of the
statute.
The third possible, and preferable, status gives the work a
form of protection that might be termed a "conditional" copy-
right. Under this approach, a work published without notice
would have copyright protection for the first five years after
publication. If nothing is done by the author (or publisher)
during those five years, any copyright protection would lapse
and, in effect, the copyright would be void ab initio .20 How-
ever, if during the five years the claim to copyright is registered
and the notice is applied to those copies distributed thereafter,
the copyright would be "validated"21 and would be valid ab ini-
tio. Anyone who was misled by the lack of notice on an earlier
copy would be protected as an "innocent infringer" under sec-
tion 405(b) of the Act. This third possible status has the advan-
tage that if an author wishes to sue for infringement of his
conditional copyright, he must register before he can file suit in
federal court on a copyright infringement claim.22
The Act requires that "validation" to perfect a copyright
must occur within five years immediately after publication
without notice.23 During this five-year period, a cloud of doubt
obscures the copyright's ultimate validity because the author's
intent is, as yet, unknown. Failure to take any action during
that five-year period results in the copyright being terminated.
A truly inadvertent omission followed by attempts within five
19. See supra note 11.
20. Latin, meaning "[f]rom the beginning; from the first act; from the inception."
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 6 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
21. Absent any definition or statement in the statute, the word "Validation" is in-
tended to describe the affirmative action that an author must take to perfect the copy-
right for the full statutory term of a work published without notice.
22. 17 U.S.C. app. § 411 (1976).
23. 17 U.S.C. app. § 405(a)(2) (1976).
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years by the author to add notice to substantially all copies will
validate the copyright.24 There is, however, an issue as to
whether validation can be effected during the five year period
if the notice originally was deliberately omitted. Only one case
has considered this point and in no case has there been a final
adjudication.25
IV
The Statutory Language Conflicts with the
Legislative Intent
A problem of statutory interpretation arises because the lan-
guage used in section 405(a) (2) of the statute26 is in apparent
conflict with the intention of the drafters of the Act as ex-
pressed in the legislative history.27 The possible ambiguity in-
volves the meaning of the word "discovered" in the phrase
"after the omission has been discovered." It is not clear who
must discover the omission-the author, the publisher, or a
third party (who might be an infringer) .28 Furthermore, there
is an issue as to whether "discovery" occurs when the omission
of the physical notice becomes known, or when the legal effect
of the omission becomes known. It is also unclear whether a
reasonable effort must be made to add notice to copies already
distributed before the discovery of the omission or how fast ef-
forts must be made to add the notice to copies distributed
thereafter. Clearly, there are different schools of thought.
Professor Melville B. Nimmer in his authoritative work Nim-
mer on Copyright takes a position opposite that taken by the
only case in point, O'Neill Developments, Inc. v. Galen Kilburn,
Inc. .29 Nimmer apparently believes that it is inappropriate for
courts to examine the legislative history in construing the stat-
24. W. PATRON, AN AUTHOR'S GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT LAw 80 (1980).
25. The authors have also found no law review articles that discuss the point. [Ed-
itors Note: as discussed in notes 14 and 18, supra, Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichten-
berg & Co. is another case which discusses the issue of deliberate omission of
copyright notice. The court in that case came to a conclusion opposite that of the au-
thors of this article.]
26. See supra note 9.
27. See supra notes 10 and 11.
28. An innocent infringer of a work published without notice would be protected
by Section 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) for his acts committed before receiving notice of the
claim to copyright. See also N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAw § 8.14 (1981).
29. 524 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ga. 1981). [Editor's Note: Nimmer's position is sup-
ported by the court's opinion in Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 552 F.
Supp. at 1309-1312.]
No. 21
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ute because there is no ambiguity in the statutory language. In
O'Neill, however, a Georgia federal district court considered
Nimmer's viewpoint but found that there was an ambiguity in
the language. 0
A. Nimmer's Position
In Nimmer on Copyright, Professor Nimmer recognizes that
Congress intended to provide for curing both unintentional
and deliberate omissions of notice, but notes that this legisla-
tive intent is apparently contradicted by the reasonable effort
requirement of the statute."1 Nimmer observes that the
clearly stated legislative intent would appear to be contra-
dicted by the reasonable effort requirement in the statutory
text. It can hardly be said that a deliberate omission of notice
comports with the requirement that a reasonable effort be
made to add notice to all copies ... publicly distributed after
the omission has been discovered. 32
He adds
At most it [deliberate omission] would appear to mean that no-
tice may be deliberately omitted from the first copy .... If
such omission was deliberate, it must be immediately known
(or 'discovered'), and hence the deliberate omission of notice
from any subsequent copies ... would constitute a failure to
use 'a reasonable effort' to add the notice to such subsequent
copies .... No matter how clear the expressed legislative in-
tent, it cannot be given effect where it contradicts an unambig-
uous statutory text ....
Nimmer thus appears to take the position that deliberate early
omission of notice prevents the later validation of the copy-
right by the later application of the notice and registration.
However, in a footnote,3 4 Nimmer cites a Supreme Court
case 35 which holds that the court may look to the legislative
history of an act to determine the meaning of its language no
matter how clear the words may appear on superficial exami-
nation. In that case, the Court held that a federal appellate
court erred when, in discerning the meaning of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, it excluded reference to the legis-
30. 524 F. Supp. at 713-14.
31. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 713[B] [31 (1982).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.13[b] [3] n.45 (1982).
35. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
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lative history. The Court noted "When aid to construction of
the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there
certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however
clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' "36
Certainly, there is ample ground here to examine the meaning
of the language of section 405(a) (2).
Even Nimmer does not appear to be happy with his opinion
that the courts can not, under such circumstances, look beyond
the words of the statute to the intent of the framers of the legis-
lation. In his review of the O'Neill case,37 Nimmer sympathizes
with the court but feels that it has done violence to the lan-
guage of the statute. He also recognizes that the literal inter-
pretation leads to different results between works published
outside the United States and those published within the
United States.38
B. Legislative History
Even a brief study of the Copyright Act of 1976 will indicate
that the intent therein is to preserve to the author the rights he
secures under the Act, and consequently, the Act should be in-
terpreted with that in mind. Distinguishing between "deliber-
ate" and "unintentional" omission of the notice is not the way
to preserve these rights, particularly in light of the legislative
history.
The legislative history of the general revision of the copy-
right law is the best source for determining what meaning
should be given to the language used in this provision of the
statute. Gleaned from the various reports of the history are
the following points and observations respecting the meaning
of the statutory language concerning omission of notice from a
copyrightable work.
First, there is ample evidence that the statute-makers
wanted to minimize the significance of the notice requirement,
but not to eliminate it altogether.3 9 Thus, in the design of the
Act every effort was made to preserve the copyright as sub-
sisting from fixation even if the notice is omitted altogether
(provided, of course, that the creator takes certain prescribed
remedial steps). This is one of the major changes in the frame-
36. Id.
37. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.13[B] [3] (1982).
38. Id. at § 7.13[B] 12].
39. See supra note 10.
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work of copyright made by the new law. It is repeated several
times in the legislative history that the provisions of section
405(a) should "make clear" that the notice requirements "are
not absolute" and that unlike the 1909 Act "the outright omis-
sion of a copyright notice does not automatically forfeit protec-
tion and throw the work into the public domain."'4
Thus, the statutory copyright is secured when the work is
tangibly fixed. It is not immediately lost or forfeited when the
work is published with or without notice. The drafters of the
statute declared that this is true "even if the notice is omitted
entirely," and regardless of whether the omission was "inten-
tional or unintentional."
'4 1
These rules respecting omission of notice are new and repre-
sent "a major change in the theoretical framework of American
copyright law,"42 and will have "immediate practical conse-
quences" in many cases. 43 One such consequence is that works
published without notice, "whether the omission was partial or
total, unintentional or deliberate,"44 are still subject to statu-
tory protection for at least five years. Therefore, copyright pro-
tection which is secured automatically when a work is fixed
should not be lost when the work is published even if the no-
tice is omitted-entirely, intentionally and deliberately.
45
Moreover, supporting the argument is the statute-makers' dec-
laration that the reasons for the omission have no bearing on
the copyright's validity.
C. The O'Neill Case
The problem of publication with deliberate omission of no-
tice, under the provisions of the Act of 1976 is discussed in
O'Neill Developments, Inc. v. Galen Kilburn, Inc.46 This case
has not yet been finally decided, but in a motion for a tempo-
rary restraining order, the federal district court47 held that the
40. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 146, 13136-
8 (1976) CONF. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. contains no comments on section
405 of the bill, indicating there was no disagreement between the House and the Sen-
ate of this provision.
41. Id. at 147.
42. Id. at 146.
43. COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1975).
44. Id. at 129.
45. Id. at 129-30.
46. See supra note 29.
47. Judge Orinda D. Evans, presiding.
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deliberate omission of the copyright notice was not fatal to an
action for copyright infringement.48
This case arose when O'Neill, a developer of office condomin-
ium projects, prepared a brochure describing and advertising
one of its projects. This brochure, as originally published in
February 1980, did not contain a notice of copyright. Later, Kil-
burn, a developer of a competing office condominium project,
copied portions of O'Neill's brochure in a brochure which ad-
vertised Kilburn's competing development. O'Neill admitted it
had not registered its copyright because it "had [no] reason to
believe that any other person would attempt to copy these
brochures." After learning of Kilburn's action, O'Neill began
placing a notice of copyright on its brochures, and registered
its claim to copyright.49
In the action for a temporary restraining order, the court con-
sidered Kilburn's argument that O'Neill had not complied with
Title 17 U.S.C. section 405(a) (2) because it had not made "a
reasonable effort ... to add notice" to those copies distributed
until after it learned of Kilburn's action.50 The court consid-
ered Professor Nimmer's position that the defendant's discov-
ered omission of notice cannot be cured without making a
reasonable effort to add notice to every copy in circulation."'
However, the court disagreed with Nimmer's view as being
contrary to the clearly expressed congressional intent and held
that O'Neill had cured the deliberate omission by complying
with 17 U.S.C. section 405(a) (2) by including the notice on cop-
ies later distributed and by registering its claim to copyright.52
Kilburn's argument turns on the meaning of the word "dis-
cover" in section 405(a) (2). Kilburn contends that O'Neill's
omission was . . . intentional .... Kilburn then cites Profes-
sor Nimmer for the proposition that section 405(a) (2) is in-
tended to apply primarily to inadvertent omissions of the
copyright notice.... There is another possible interpretation
of the word "discover," however. Congress could have in-
tended that copyright owners could cure deliberate omissions
by including a notice of copyright in those copies published af-
48. 524 F. Supp. at 715.
49. Id. at 712.
50. Id. at 713. Other examples of situations which were treated as publication
without notice are: 17 U.S.C. § 406(b) (incorrect year date in notice); 17 U.S.C. § 406(c)
(no name or date in notice).
51. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.13(B] [3] (1982).
52. 524 F. Supp. at 715.
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ter "discovery" of the fact that existence of a copyright has be-
come an issue.53
After the above decision in the O'Neill case was rendered,
Professor Nimmer commented on it as follows:
If there is ambiguity in the statutory language, then O'Neill is
certainly correct in its conclusion that resort to statements of
legislative intent is proper. But to find ambiguity there must
be at least two alternative meanings, each of which the lan-
guage could reasonably bear. It is submitted that the court was
in error in concluding that the statutory phrase "after the omis-
sion has been discovered" could reasonably mean after discov-
ery of the fact that the copyright may be challenged or may be
infringed, as O'Neill suggests. The word "omission" simply
will not bear this meaning. It is the discovery of "the omission"
of notice, not the discovery of the fact that the copyright may
be challenged, which triggers the "reasonable effort" require-
ment. One can sympathize with the O'Neill court's effort to
avoid copyright forfeiture, and still conclude that this was ac-
complished only at the price of violence to the statutory
language.
But if O'Neill is not followed, it would seem, then, that the
above stated legislative intent to excuse deliberate omissions
of notice can be given only the trivial effect of excusing notice
from the first published copy or phonorecord, plus the some-
what more significant effect of excusing deliberate omissions of
notice from all copies and phonorecords published outside of
the United States provided the registration requirement is ob-
served. This latter effect is not without significance in it that it
largely undercuts the statutory requirement of Sections 401(a)
and 402(a) requiring placement of notice upon copies and pho-
norecords published outside of the United States.5 4
While the O'Neill case is not final,5 5 and other courts may
have contrary opinions, 6 at the moment it seems quite possi-
ble that courts will hold that deliberate omission of the copy-
right notice does not cause the loss of copyright, if the work is
53. Id. at 713, 714. "Courts do indeed have power in certain circumstances to revise
statutes to conform them to clearly expressed legislative intent." Id. at 714.
54. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.13[B] [3] (1982).
55. As of February 15, 1983, the case was still pending before Judge Evans.
56. [Editor's Note: Indeed, Beacon Looms, Inc. v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 552 F.
Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), decided while this article was being printed, reached a de-
cision contrary to O'Neill on the issue of whether the deliberate omission of copyright
notice can be "discovered." See id. at 1310, 1311. Nevertheless, the Beacon court ap-
plied the facts of the case to § 405(a) (2) as construed by the O'Neill court, finding that
the copyright was forfeited because the defendant had failed to make reasonable effort
to cure the omission. Id. at 1311.]
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registered within five years of the first publication. The re-
quirement of making "a reasonable effort... to add notice to
all copies ... distributed ... after the omission has been dis-
covered""7 may well be ignored or construed to mean discovery
of the legal consequences of deliberate omission. If a pub-
lisher believes it is not necessary to place a notice on a work, or
does not know it is necessary to place a notice, it may be diffi-
cult to establish when the "discovery" of the omission
occurred.
In addition, a question might be raised as to who must dis-
cover the omission. The failure of the statute to specify more
details of the required discovery certainly can be held to make
the statute indefinite.
V
Conclusion
On the basis of the O'Neill case, it appears that deliberate
omission of copyright notice and subsequent distribution with
notice and registration within five years will neither act to in-
validate a copyright nor cause a forfeiture. To the contrary, it
appears that such action will validate a copyright. The court in
O'Neill did not decide what would be the effective date of the
validated copyright, but logic dictates that the copyright
should relate back to the creation of the work.
It would be logical for the courts to hold that the require-
ments for discovery of the omission of notice are sufficiently
vague and indefinite to place the meaning of the statute in
doubt, and thus allow consultation of the legislative history.
The legislative history, of course, would indicate that the intent
of the author (or publisher) is of no importance, and that only
validation of the copyright matters. As Mr. Kastenmeir noted
in the 1976 Copyright Law Revision Report:
One of the strongest arguments for revision of the present stat-
ute has been the need to avoid the arbitrary and unjust forfeit-
ures now resulting from unintentional or relatively
unimportant omissions or errors in the copyright notice. It has
been contended that the disadvantages of the notice require-
ment outweigh its values and that it should therefore be elimi-
nated or subsequently liberalized.58
57. 17 U.S.C. app. § 405(a) (2) (1976).
58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 143 (1976).
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It is our belief that the court in the O'Neill case reached the
correct conclusion; however, it would seem preferable to have
based the decision on the intent of the framers of the legisla-
tion as opposed to the inequitable results of the language of
the statute.
